circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the South-Western Army.

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized.

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection.

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons.

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the two factions of the OUN were unable to penetrate institutional channels, it was sometimes possible for nationalist groups limited to specific localities to do so. No appraisal of the strength of nationalism in the East Ukraine during 1941–43 would be complete without an examination of this penetration of the institutional framework by nationalists. In such an examination it is essential to proceed with great caution, for it is all too easy for adherents of Ukrainian nationalist groups to ascribe in retrospect an exaggerated importance to their influence during the years of occupation. It would be tedious to describe the complicated and frequently unsatisfying ways in which the element of fact in inflated postwar accounts has been sought. Suffice it to say at this point that the basic approach has been the testing of the details of proper names, place names, and dates contained in each narration (whether in the form of printed memoir or oral testimony) against the abundant but superficial material contained in the Ukrainian press during the war years. In addition, the available wartime underground publications and German reports have been utilized. In this fashion, at least the extent of the real acquaintance of the narrator with the area he describes can be estimated, and frequently the validity of his assessment of the role of persons and events can be surmised by reading between the lines of descriptions published legally—but with a trace of "Aesopian" language—during the war.

Primary targets for the efforts of nationalist elements in their campaign to win access to the East Ukrainian masses were the administrative apparatuses existing at the local level throughout the area of German occupation. The general outline of the machinery of government established by the Nazi regime in the occupied eastern territories has been described, and the policy of the officials in charge traced. The ruthless policy pursued made open activity of the OUN groups impossible, and their failure to understand this fact in time resulted in the slaughter of many of their adherents. The extent to which nationalist administrative officials could survive in the capital has already been indicated, however, and what was true of Kiev was true to a more marked degree of many of the smaller centers of the Ukraine. In spite

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring
● 634 every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

111 The limitations on control arising from the small number of
634 German personnel available were made yet narrower by the
727 language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly
626 reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These
634 physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to
727 concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

634 The physical limitations of German power meant that the
727 local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans, but their size prevented them from being completely controlled. In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations, the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist cause were of some importance in winning support for it. Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks, and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4] having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value of the change was considerable. The same was true of the widespread use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors; they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile elements were introduced into the administration to replace the nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss of prestige; the official language, however, always remained Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt attitudes of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraïna* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1910 the revenue receipts from the respective Governments of the Ukraine were as follows: 652

	Roubles.
Volhynia	24,400,000
Podolia	24,300,000
Kiev	128,900,000
Chernigov	18,400,000
Poltava	24,900,000
Kharkov	46,200,000
Yekaterinoslav	37,300,000
Kherson	80,400,000
Taurida	12,800,000
Total	397,600,000

The total revenue of European Russia for the same year was 1,522,800,000 roubles. In the period 1906–10 the revenue showed a good expansion in the Governments of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, and Kherson. Elsewhere in the Ukraine it appeared to be stationary.

After the Imperial authorities, the *zemstvos* are the most important bodies authorized to raise taxes. Their revenue comes from taxes on land, houses, and factory buildings, and from licences for distilleries, 69 per cent. being derived from the land tax. Their expenses are (1) obligatory: local civil administration, upkeep of district roads, bridges, &c., and health service; (2) facultative: public instruction and provision of medical attendance in rural districts. Their functions have gradually spread in a somewhat irregular manner, and vary very much according to the degree of energy shown by the committees. Some have embarked on commercial schemes, such as the installation of telephone systems or trade in agricultural machinery: others perform only the minimum of their duties. 651 652 634

Five Governments of the Ukraine have a *zemstvo* organization, and their budgets of receipts and expenses, which appear to balance exactly, are as follows for the years 1906 and 1910: 652 634

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Government.	1906. *Roubles.*	1910. *Roubles.*
Yekaterinoslav . .	5,210,000	8,241,000
Poltava . . .	6,737,000	8,750,000
Taurida . . .	3,599,000	4,576,000
Kharkov . . .	5,753,000	9,168,000
Kherson . . .	3,808,000	5,542,000

Thirty-one towns in the Ukraine have municipal administrations, and can raise taxes and contract loans for purposes similar to those of the *zemstvo* budgets. A considerable debt has been incurred. The towns of Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa have borrowed money for municipal purposes in foreign markets; of a total debt of 53,000,000 roubles, these three towns account for 35,000,000 roubles.

The *mirs* or local communes can also raise some taxes for purely local purposes. Obligatory taxes are levied for local communal administration, provision of granaries for storing food-stuffs, upkeep of local roads on peasant lands, and insurance against fire and inundations. Facultative powers of taxation are in the hands of the *mirs* for the building and maintenance of churches, schools, and hospitals, and other special local needs. There is a great deal of irregularity in the levying and administration of these taxes.

(2) Banking

The banks of the Ukraine fall into several well-defined groups. In the first place come banks which are State or semi-State institutions. These are the Imperial State Bank, the Land Bank of the Nobility, the Peasants' Land Bank, and the State Savings Bank.

The Imperial State Bank is a Government institution with a wide sphere of activity. It controls the currency and note issue, being the only bank issuing notes. It undertakes general banking and bill broking, besides having close relations with the Treasury for revenue, loan, and other purposes. It makes large loans to private banks; up to 1910 the total amount was £189,000,000. It also advances money on merchandise, principally on

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 68. The superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies and of their Executive Committees.

634 Art. 69. The regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments and Administrations of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Art
a General Department
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry
a Department of Public Education
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Department of Roads

and the following Administrations:

a Cinematographic Administration
a Light Industry Administration
a Local Fuel Industry Administration
an Agricultural Administration
a Food Industry Administration
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the Region, the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the Union-Republican Ministries of the Timber Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fish Industry and Textile Industry:

a Department of the Timber Industry
a Department of the Meat and Dairy Industry
a Department of the Building Materials Industry
a Department of the Fish Industry
a Department of the Textile Industry.

625 Art. 70. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice of the Union set up their own administrations under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in accordance with the conditions of the region and on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 71. The Departments and Administrations of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the corresponding regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 72. The area Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees carry on their work on the basis of the laws voted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and orders of the Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies and their Executive Committees.

632 Art. 73. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov 21, 1949]

Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by election districts on the following bases:

in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries United!" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.